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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DAYTON AGREEMENT1
The prime framework for determining the process and pattern for returning refugees and displaced
persons was set by the Dayton Agreement which ended the Bosnian War. But in order to understand the
terms for Dayton, a brief sketch of the historical and theoretical background to Dayton is in order. Without
rehearsing the onset and progress of the war in any detail, this chapter will focus on the historical
background which will  include an outline of the early warnings about the onset of the war and the
diplomacy used to prevent it and then conducted during the war to end it. As with the rest of the book, the
focus will be on the internationals rather than on the participants to the conflict itself.
 
In the fourteenth century war between San Gimignano and Lucca in what is now Italy, the fierce
condottiere of Lucca, Castruccio Castracani, gave protection to the merchants of San Gimignano exiled
by its rulers. The war began in 1322 when the rulers of San Gimignano refused to repatriate the exiles.
Refusal to repatriate refugees was a casus belli. The war with Lucca should have ended on 23 September
in 1325 with the decimation of the San Gimignano army at Altopascio. Four years later, exhausted by war,
the city states with overlapping jurisdictions and parties within each state loyal to or siding with the enemy,
and each side financially and militarily bankrupt from the long extended war, signed a peace agreement on
29 July 1329. Out of that exhaustion and inter-city warfare, Florence, whose involvement began with its
role as arbitrator, emerged as the party who imposed peace and under whose imperial power and  shadow
San Gimignano and Lucca fell for two centuries. Thus do states in the assertion of their independence lose
their absolute independence and become protectorates of larger empires.
The issue of repatriating refugees under the benevolence of an external power with its own agenda
is as old as human history. However, America as the single remaining superpower after the demise of the
Cold War became involved with the Yugoslav crisis, and the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina more
particularly, with the greatest reluctance.2
Two superpowers had emerged at the end of WWII. Each believed it had a special mission in
history that had global dimensions. America, the power that celebrated free enterprise, democracy and
technological progress, emerged victorious. The Soviet Union disintegrated even though its muscle power
and armaments remained largely intact, for its vascular system was clogged by mismanagement and an
economic system that could not support its role in the arms race, and its ideological nervous system was
shattered by the collapse of its legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. In the aftermath, the former
Yugoslavia also disintegrated, but in a bloodier and more physically devastating way than in even
Chechnya, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
This is not as surprising as it might seem. I remembered reading an account Arthur Miller gave of
his meeting with two Yugoslav United Nations delegates at Lillian Hellman’s apartment just after Tito’s
break with Stalin and Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Comintern. In Miller’s account, the Yugoslav
rebellion was viewed by him as an expression of ‘gut-nationalism’ in opposition to the precepts of both
Marxism and the instrumental rationalism of capitalism.3  But the nationalism that Miller recognized was a
gut nationalism still controlled and limited by state nationalism. In the early nineties, that gut nationalism
would be turned against the Yugoslav state itself as old communist apparatchniks manipulated that
nationalism to consolidate and expand their own power once the Communist idol had totally disintegrated
as the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and, in the end, even the Bosniacs, sought to forge a state that would
protect and enhance their ethnic nationalism.
It was this reawakened power of ethnicity that complicated the problem in the Balkans when, during the
Cold War, ethnic expression had been suppressed in the Eastern Block as the American and Russian
empires rivaled for supremacy. 
Yugoslavia had historically played the nationalist card to keep some distance from the predatory
Soviet empire as it tried to forge an independent path to a communist utopia. When I first visited Yugoslavia
in the early seventies and also had my first (and last) wonderful massage,  I asked the masseur his opinion
of socialism in Yugoslavia. He replied, “Socialism! You want socialism. Go to Denmark.” It would be no
surprise that in the collapse of communism in Yugoslavia, nationalism dissolved from the civic nationalism
of Yugoslavia to its lowest common denominator, the ethnic nationalism that characterized the conflicts in
the nineties once the official ideology of the civic state had become an empty shell without any legitimacy.
It was as if the politically ambitious leaders who had been indoctrinated to believe in nationalism had also
become convinced that any ideology was a matter of empty rhetoric and a fraud. They seemed to be out
to demonstrate that ethnic nationalism was the ir irrational dangerous force which the West believed it to
be. Civil war, an extremely violent one, ensued.4
As is widely acknowledged, wars against proximate others, that is people with whom we are close
but who are branded as different, are frequently the most vicious and intemperate. According to Charles
Dickens, this occurred because wars against proximate others were unnatural, so the cruelty involved was
equally unnatural.5 According to Freud, it was not so much a matter of what could be regarded as unnatural
as much as the fact that conflicts over minor matters are so much more intense than conflicts over the major
issues of the day which few understand.6 But whether it is Freud’s narcissism of minor differences or
Dicken’s unnatural acts, or some other explanation altogether, whether in reference to the genocide in
Rwanda, the Holocaust against Ashkenazi Jews who spoke a Yiddish version of German, or the ethnic
cleansing in the Balkans, wars against proximate others can be horrific.7
However, the West in general, and America as its leader, failed to act on this general knowledge
or the more specific knowledge that ethnic knowledge was about to split Yugoslavia apart not only into
different political entities, but entities which would largely be cleansed of their ethnic minorities dominating
the polities in the other units. The West failed to act effectively even when the degree of violence was
clearly demonstrated.8 
The failure of the West to act cannot be attributed to any failure to anticipate the violent eruptions
that would convulse Yugoslavia and the fragments onto which it fractured during the nineties. The war in
Yugoslavia did not take the world by surprise. There were many early warnings.9  Intellectuals had
anticipated the self-immolation of Yugoslavia in 1987, the CIA had done so officially in September 1990,
and the American embassy in Belgrade had echoed that prediction. Yugoslavia as an integral entity would
not survive was the constant refrain. Nationalism, manipulated by ambitious politicians, would bring about
that  disintegration. Worst of all, according to most prognostications, that self-destruction would not occur
without violence and tremendous destruction. 
Why, then, did no one act to prevent the war? Why were all diplomatic efforts focused on retaining
what many, if not most, observers saw as an unsustainable unified entity? Why was the use of force as a
threat to back up whatever policy was adopted not ever seriously considered by the politicians? Why, after
the Gulf War, was the specter of the Vietnam War still haunting the White House, not simply as a fear of
being involved in a sinkhole from which the US would not be able to extract itself, but from the mind-set
of Vietnam which still thought in terms of dominoes, this time, not that one domino would lead to another -
which, in this case, was the war with Croatia leading directly to the war in Bosnia and then to Kosovo, but
that one tender step into the Yugoslav quagmire in the use of troops for enforcement purposes would lead
down the slippery slope to total and irreversible American commitment? Why were the US and the
Europeans unwilling to threaten Milosevic with war for invading a foreign country as Saddam Hussein had
been? Why did the Americans view any commitment, beyond the use of diplomacy and the threat of
economic sanctions, as a commitment of prestige and credibility which would entail total military
involvement is a situation that would quickly spiral out of control?
The answer includes a number of contiguous elements. First, American policy was governed by
realpolitic. With the end of the Cold War, the fate of Yugoslavia was not a critical matter for US self
interest, or so it seemed at the time for those who defined self-interest narrowly. As Mark Danner
summarized it in one of the six series of review articles he wrote for The New York Review of Books, “In
1990 and 1991, when vigorous early diplomacy should have been brought to bear, the ‘principals’ had their
hands full preparing and directing the Gulf War; then, having triumphed in the Gulf with an ease none had
anticipated, they had little interest in risking the victory’s political rewards by undertaking what appeared
certain to be a much more risky engagement in a country that seemed plainly to have outlived its
importance.”10 US foreign policy  was described as characterized by “distracted powerlessness”.If the
narrative of the Yugoslav conflict can be summarized, in Zimmerman’s memorable phrase, as a “story of
villains - villains guilty of destroying the multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia”, its is also a story of cowards,
cowards afraid to risk lives, afraid to risk the wrath of a domestic political backlash, afraid of losing the
sense of invincibility resulting from the victory in the Gulf War earlier that year. 
But what about the war itself? Why was it so inevitable? The causes of the Yugoslav War were
many and included the collapse of one belief system and the resurrection of nationalism, manipulated by
ambitious and power-driven politicians;  the economic legacy of communism itself which left Yugoslavia
20 billion in debt with state-owned industries that were inefficient , over-manned and under-financed; the
imposition on Yugoslavia of a structural adjustment program which undermined Prime Minister Ante
Markovic’s modernization and democratization program with its narrow economic obsessiveness which
took politics into account as only a factor that affected economic risks when the post-Washington doctrine
of the Wolfson World Bank had not yet been proclaimed; the large unemployment that resulted that helped
fuel the nationalist fervour and the search for scapegoats.  
But that simply explains the forces at work at dissolving the union. It does not explain the resort to
violence. After all, Czechoslovakia had fractured into Slovakia and the Czech Republik without war. Why
could that not have been the root of Yugoslavia. Because, with the exception of Slovenia and Serbia,
Croatia had and Bosnia/Herzegovina had significant Serb minorities. And Bosnia had a significant Croatian
minority as well. Though the right of each unit was legally built into the Yugoslav constitution, the principle
of secession could be extended from one political unit of the Yugoslav republic to one minority within any
unit if the basis of secession was nationalism. For what minority wanted to be ruled by a state in which a
nationalist movement held power.
These were the reasons close observers saw the breakup of Yugoslavia as inevitable and that it
would take place violently. If it was foreseen, why did outsiders not intervene to stop it? Because they were
not willing to risk the lives of their own soldiers for a cause that did not appear to be in their vital nation
interest. They had not understood that with immediate coverage by satellite TV, no event anywhere around
the world covered in this way could stay out of the hearts and minds of the citizens of each and every
country in the west. 
Why did the European states not intervene? European leaders did not have Vietnam as an albatross
around their necks. Each had his own cross to bear. German faced the complications and costs of
reunification. France still had its economic colonies in Africa to worry about. Great Britain was still
struggling with the “troubles” in northern Ireland. In any case, Europe may have been an economic giant,
but, on its own, it was a military pygmy. In any case, the Europeans were not able to forge a coherent
policy, let alone one that would the threat of the use of force to back it up. Without American leadership,
NATO could not be used, and George Bush was unwilling to commit forces even as a potential use for that
which was perceived to be remote from American interests. 
What about Bill Clinton? Had he not tried shame Bush for his failure to do anything about
Yugoslavia in the 1992 elections. After all, during the election campaign, the full force of the Serb army had
been used to bolster the Croatian Serb separatists in the Krajina region to wrest control of that area,
produce 80,000 Croatian refugees and declare a separate Serb republic. It was during the election
campaign that viewers were voyeurs of a modern seige as Vukovar withstood the Serb assault for almost
four months until it fell one week after Bill Clinton was elected as President of the United States.11 After
the capture of Vukovar, the American public would learn of the atrocities committed by the Serbs against
the residents of one hospital and then against Croats in general, military and civilian alike.
Clinton in his presidential campaign in 1992 had  repeatedly said: “ethnic cleansing will not stand”.
Why did Bill Clinton not intervene after he took office? It may have been to late for Croatia. But it was not
too late to save Bosnia from violent conflict and the creation of more refugees and displaced persons from
Serb aggression. Warren Zimmerman had faulted the Bush administration for inaction. Now Clinton would
have his chance to demonstrate he was no more capable of undertaking any effective initiative than Bush.
Of course, he had some excuse. Initiative for Yugoslavian policy had already been transferred to
the Europeans. But the real reasons were internal. The realists within the Clinton administration were no
more willing to subordinate other policy interests considered to be central to American interests to ex-
Yugoslavia. And the liberal internationalists such as Vice-President Al Gore and UN Ambassador,
Madelaine Albright, who wanted to punish, or, at the very least, limit the victories of the Serb aggressors,
never could devise a plane that would not entail a potential risk of American troops. This was long before
the Somalia fiasco of late 1993 and PDD 25 of the Spring of 1994. And in Yugoslavia, the military had not
yet ridden into the conflict zone on the coattails of the humanitarians.  The Clinton administration was not
yet prepared to undertake a foreign policy initiative that would entail a willingness to commit troops or
significant resources. And a Yugoslav initiative, to be effective, would require both. 
What about the Europeans? Surely after the dismemberment of Croatia, they understood the
importance of preventing a far worse tragedy in Bosnia. Again, the key was a willingness to back
diplomacy with the threat of force, a threat that had to be credible. For Serbian President Slobodan
Milosovic, who had called the initial shots on both Croatia and Bosnia, was not about to be swayed by
diplomatic niceties even though he did not go out of his way to throw the callow behaviour of the Europeans
in their face. So the Europeans backed a diplomatic initiative led by Cyrus Vance and David Owen for
formalizing the process of ethnic cleansing while retaining the semblance of a multicultural unified state with
the ethnic division of Bosnia into ten cantons within a weak central government. But Srebrenika was the
key city in the narrow neck which joined western and eastern Serb controlled areas of Bosnia. And Vance
and Owen had included Srebrenica within the Muslim-dominated canton of Tuzla. 
Even though Milosevic had endorsed the plan, the Bosnian Serbs rejected it and officials of the
incoming Clinton administration did not give the plan the support it required for it met neither the objectives
of the liberal internationalists who wanted ethnic cleansing reversed and its perpetrators punished, nor the
goals of the realists who wanted further conflict avoided only if it did not involve any US commitments.
Thus,  for all the talk of reversing ethnic cleansing, the Clinton administration was as impotent as the Bush
administration had been, while carrying the added burden of being hypocrites.
In the meanwhile, the political realists in the region were dealing with realities and had now
accepted ethnic cleansing as a fait accompli. By the summer of 1993, the Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris
Silajdic, had agreed to accept the Serb held suburbs in Sarajevo for Srebrenica.12  At the same time, the
Europeans, and, to a lesser degree at the time, use humanitarian assistance to cover up diplomatic failure.
Humanitarianism was not just a substitute for politics; it was a cover up for diplomatic failure, a vacuum in
policy and moral cowardice. Aid had prevented the Bosnians from being totally decimated, but it also did
nothing to reverse ethnic cleansing or deny the Serbs their ultimate victory.
Srebrenica had been declared a UN “safe area” in April 1993. By 1994, the US had reversed its
earlier policy and assumed a leadership role on Croatia and Bosnia. The Contact Group [diplomats from
US, UK, France, Germany and Russia] had by now accepted the reality of ethnic division and drew up
plans to award the Serbs 49% of the territory of Bosnia and allot the Croats and Bosniacs 51% of the
territory. In March, the Washington Agreement ended the Croat-Bosniac war and establish a federation
of two different ethnically dominated areas within a single federation. At the same time, it began to ensure
that the Croats and Bosnians had the muscle to back the political initiatives with force. The arms embargo
to the Bosnians was lifted and Serb artillery areas and ammunition dumps were targeted by NATO fighter
planes. This “lift and strike” policy was not intended to reverse ethnic cleansing so much as to set the
conditions for ending the war.
The first eight months of 1995 would indeed produce this result by reversing the Serb gains in
Croatia and acceding off-setting Serb gains in Bosnia. In February, now with a large and reasonably well-
equipped army facing the Serbs who were spread out over the territory of Bosnia, President Tudjman of
Croatia demanded the withdrawal of UN troops separating the two sides in the Krajina area and, in
August, launched his strike force which quickly recaptured the area and sent approximately 250,000 of its
Serb inhabitants into exile into eastern Bosnia and the Federal republic of Yugoslavia. More refugees had
been produced. But Croatia’s gain would come at Bosnia’s loss.
In February, faced with a losing hand, President Slobodan Milosevic reached a tentative deal with
the Americans to accept a unified Bosnia, cut off supplies for the Bosnian Serbs and agreed to recognize
Bosnia in return for lifting the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro as well as granting almost
complete autonomy to the Bosnian Serbs. Clinton, however, rejected the deal. He did not trust Milosovic
who had rhetorically assented to many agreements while so-called ‘irregulars’ were supposedly responsible
for all breaches in security . The US had not been given the levers to control the outcome as any decision
to reimpose sanctions would be taken by the whole of the Security Council. Further, the agreement made
no provision for saving face and reversing the results of ethnic cleansing. 
Then events became dramatic. On the 25th and 26th of May, NATO planes bombed an important
arms depot near Pale. General Mladic seized 300 UN troops as hostages in retaliation. In June, a Serb
surface-to-air rocket knocked down a US F-16 fighter. The feeble attempts to use force to bring the Serbs
to heel had backfired and  panicked Clinton’s European allies who had the majority of troops on the
ground. By mid-June, the West had capitulated to the Serbs. There would be strict new guidelines on air
strikes - that is, there would be none, except for the most direct and overwhelming assault against UN
peacekeepers. General Ratko Mladic then released the UN soldiers he held captive. 
This was almost immediately followed by a full scale assault on the safe area of Srebrenica, its
capture on the 11th of July, the rape of its women  and the massacre of its adult males. Thus, when
Srebrenica fell, the illusion of reversing ethnic cleansing presumably should also have collapsed. But it did
not even as General Mladic ordered the women and children of Srebrenica to board the 60 buses he had
ready. Forty-five thousand Muslims of Srebrenica had been misled by the UN guarantee of a safe area,
but this was only one year after one million Tutus in Rwanda had been misled by the presence of UN
peacekeepers there who withdrew as soon as their lives were shown to be at risk when ten Belgian
peacekeepers were killed followed the 6 April 1994 coup against President Habyarimana. 
The UN military commanders were no more able to undercut the misconceived policy in Bosnia
that they were able a year earlier to do anything about the slaughter of civilians in Rwanda. Any robust
response was always vetoed by their political bosses in New York or undercut by political compromises
that were merely disguised surrenders to the demonstration of force. As in Rwanda where the prime interest
had been the safety of the peacekeepers and of the ex-pat humanitarian volunteers, the prime interest in
yugoslavia had been the safety of the Dutch peacekeepers in their observer post in Srebrenica and not the
inhabitants of the city. 
Instead of political policy backed by force, we had public rhetoric and gestures backed by retreats.
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